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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the causal effect of foreign acquisition on R&D intensity in 
targeted domestic firms. We are able to distinguish domestic multinationals and non-multinationals, 
which allows us to investigate the fear that the change in ownership of domestic to foreign 
multinationals leads to a reduction in R&D activity in the country, as headquarter activities are 
relocated to the new owner’s home country.  We use unique and rich firm level data for the Swedish 
manufacturing sector and different micro-econometric estimation strategies in order to control for 
the potential endogeneity of the acquisition dummy.  Overall, our results give no support to the 
fears that foreign acquisition of domestic firms lead to a brain drain of R&D activity in Swedish 
MNEs. Rather, this paper finds robust evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to increasing R&D 






Acknowledgements: We are grateful to participants at the Aarhus - Kiel International Economics Workshop and the 
ETSG 2009 in Rome for helpful comments.  Holger Görg is also affiliated with GlobID at Aarhus School of Business / 
University of Aarhus.  He gratefully acknowledges financial support through the European Commission, Research 
Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities, 
Grant Agreement no: 244 552.     1
1. Introduction 
 
The debate on the home country effects of multinational activity is still lively.  While the popular 
media and the general public tend to associate outward investment by multinationals necessarily 
with economic losses (in employment, wages, etc.), much economic research has found that this is 
not the case.  Indeed, studies find that multinational firms have an advantage over others in terms of 
efficiency and productivity, which can be further exploited abroad.  Even if they relocate activity 
from the home country abroad, they tend to concentrate on high value / high skill headquarter 
activities at home, and overall there is little evidence that they substitute host country for home 
country employment (e.g., Blomström, Fors and Lipsey, 1997; Barba Navaretti et al., 2006; Hijzen 
et al., 2009).   
 
The recent wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions has added a new dimension to this 
debate.  The question that is discussed now is: What will happen to the domestic multinationals, and 
in particular their headquarter activities, once they are acquired by a foreign owner?  In Sweden, the 
country to which our empirical analysis pertains, this has been an important issue.  Former flagship 
Swedish multinationals such as Volvo, Saab, Asea and Astra were acquired by foreign owners and, 
therefore, are no longer Swedish.  Does this change in ownership imply that high skill intensive 
headquarter activities will now be no longer carried out in Sweden, but in the headquarters of the 
foreign acquirer in the US or Switzerland?   
 
This is an important question that is not only of academic interest, but also has strong policy 
implications.  Headquarter activities in multinationals are high skill activities such as R&D and 
management.  R&D may be the most important here, as this is an activity that is likely to generate 
positive externalities.  Hence, relocation of the R&D activity abroad may lead to potential welfare 
losses (Krugman, 1991).   
 
In standard models of the multinational enterprise, such as Markusen (2002) firms can potentially 
separate headquarter and production activities.  The former are activities such as R&D, marketing, 
management, and they are assumed to be more relatively skill intensive than production.  Assuming 
further that countries may differ in their relative factor endowments, firms will separate HQ and   2
production if countries are sufficiently different.  In that case, HQs will be located in the relatively 
skill abundant, production in the relatively skill scarce country.
1   
 
The question we address in this paper is: What happens to the HQ activities, or more specifically, 
R&D activity in Sweden, once the multinational gets taken over by a foreign multinational, which, 
by definition, has its headquarter activities in its own home country?  Will the R&D of the firm be 
relocated to the home country of the new owner, depleting Sweden of its high skill activity?  Or will 
the R&D location be maintained and perhaps even extended as a result of the foreign takeover?  
And, how do these effects compare to the R&D effects of acquisitions of domestic non-
multinationals – is there a special “multinationality effect”? 
 
Standard theory has little to say on this, as they treat all multinational activity as greenfield activity, 
i.e., setting up new facilities abroad, rather than acquiring already existing plants.  However, recent 
models, such as, Nocke and Yeaple (2008) consider explicitly the choice between greenfield 
investment and merger & acquisition.  They posit that acquisition will take place if firms intend to 
access the assets held by the acquisition target, and if there is complementarity between assets held 
by the acquirer and by the target.  While Nocke and Yeaple do not explicitly consider the post-
acquisition performance in the target plant, one hypothesis in line with their intuition may be that it 
depends on the nature of the complementarity/substitutability  of the HQ and especially R&D 
activities in the target and acquirer country.  If R&D activities are complementary then they may be 
left in their respective countries according to their respective expertise.  If the activities are however 
strong substitutes, it is likely that the acquirer will relocate all HQ and R&D activities to its home 
country in order to avoid wasteful duplication of activities in the two countries. 
 
Bertrand et al. (2008) also develop a theoretical model which highlights the role of 
complementarities.  In their model, the foreign acquirer has incentives to increase investments in 
new R&D in order to make rivals less aggressive in their investment behavior.  They show that the 
complementarity between the R&D assets of the foreign owner and the domestic firm must be high 
for an acquisition to take place.  The better the initial quality of the R&D assets in the domestic 
                                                 
1 Indeed, Markusen (1998) cites Sweden as a prominent example for his model, where the country will host HQ 
activities of multinational firms, while production is undertaken in affiliates abroad.  Country size also plays a role in 
Markusen (2002), though this can be neglected for our purposes.  Ekholm and Hakkala (2007) present a related model, 
which also allows for agglomeration forces in production as well as R&D activity.     3
firm, the higher is the alternative costs for not acquiring it.  Another result is that post-acquisition, 
the acquirer has a strong incentive to expand R&D activities in the target firm.   
 
These theoretical ideas are both intuitive and practically relevant.  As, for example, the recent 
discussions of the relationship between GM and Opel show, one reason for GM to try to hold on to 
Opel is the strong R&D expertise in the German HQ as relates to small and medium sized vehicles, 
whereby GM’s expertise is rather in larger motor cars.  Hence, the R&D activities in the two firms 
are likely to be complementary, and hence, may be left in their respective countries.  This is the 
case in this example, where Opel has extensive R&D facilities in Europe, while GM also undertakes 
R&D in the US.  Similar considerations about asset and R&D complementarity seem also to be 
important for the Chinese car maker Geely’s intentions to acquire Volvo from Ford.   
 
We look at the effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D in the target firm empirically.  We do not 
provide a direct test of a specific theoretical model, as an empirical test would need detailed data on 
the nature of HQ activities in acquirer and target.  Unfortunately, we do not have such data 
available.  Rather, we use this theoretical discussion as a motivation for our empirical analysis, as it 
shows that there is a rationale for our research question, since the expected effect is ambiguous and, 
hence, merits empirical investigation. 
 
On the empirical side, our paper relates to two strands of literature.  Firstly, there is a literature on 
the relationship between M&As in general, and foreign acquisitions in particular, on R&D in the 
host country (e.g., Cassiman et al, 2005; Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006).  This literature, however, does 
generally not look at the effect on the target firm, but rather overall R&D, and also does not 
specifically look at the experience of domestic multinationals.  The second strand of literature is on 
the effects of foreign acquisitions on the target firm.  Here, studies generally look at productivity, 
employment or wages (e.g., Harris and Robinson, 2002; Girma and Görg, 2007; Huttunen, 2007).  
More closely related to our paper, Bertrand (2009) investigates empirically post acquisition R&D 
performance in target firms using French data.  However, he does not distinguish targets into 
multinationals and non-multinationals which, as we argue, is a highly policy relevant issue.  Also, 
Bertrand et al. (2008) provide some evidence that acquisitions are associated with higher R&D 
intensity than greenfield investments.  While their theoretical model also has predictions about the   4
post-acquisition effect on R&D (as discussed above), they do not have data to test this empirically.  
Our paper specifically looks at the post-acquisition R&D performance in the target firm.   
 
We study in detail the acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign owners, and examine in particular 
the implications for R&D activity in the target firms using a number of different estimation 
techniques to establish robust results.  We use recent unique detailed firm level data for Sweden to 
investigate the extent of R&D undertaken in the Swedish firms before and after acquisition.  We 
look at the timing of these effects, considering changes in R&D activity one, two and three years 
after the acquisition took place.  Most importantly, we also contrast the effect of acquisition on 
R&D for domestic multinationals and on domestic non-multinationals.   
 
This, thus, addresses directly the question of what happens to an important aspect of HQ activities 
(R&D) after a domestic multinational is taken over by foreign owners.  Is it different than the 
acquisition of a purely domestic (non-multinational) firm?  One may perhaps expect differences, as 
R&D activities in multinationals are likely to present HQ activities that may be expected to be more 
extensive than that of a purely domestic firm, as the multinational serves additional foreign markets 
(Markusen, 1998).  We show this to be the case in our summary statistics in Table 3.  Hence, the 
question as to whether R&D in the foreign acquirer and the domestic target are complements or 
substitutes may be even more important for the case of Swedish multinationals and any acquisition 
effects may be more pronounced.  To the best of our knowledge, we are to first paper to explore this 
highly policy relevant issue in any detail. 
 
Sweden is an interesting case to analyze in this context.  As our data show (see Table 1), the 
number of foreign firms and the share of employment in these firms has steadily increased over the 
last decades.  Sweden also traditionally has had a number of well known domestic multinationals, 
some of which have been acquired by foreign owners in the recent past.  It is, therefore, particularly 
interesting to see what happened to one particular headquarter service, namely R&D, after the 
incidence of foreign acquisitions.   
 
In the empirical analysis, we identify the acquisition effect in a difference-in-differences set up.  We 
take particular account of the potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision by firstly 
implementing an instrumental variables approach.  Furthermore, we check the robustness of the IV   5
approach with estimations based on combining difference-in-differences with propensity score 
matching techniques.   
 
To preview our results, we find robust evidence that there is on average no negative effect from 
acquisition on R&D performance in Swedish plants.  Rather, the evidence suggests that there are 
strong positive effects, depending on the specification.  We do not find any evidence that foreign 
acquisition of domestic multinationals leads to a relocation of R&D activity abroad and 
subsequently reductions of R&D in Sweden.  In the light of Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Bertrand 
et al. (2008), one possible interpretation of these results is that they are in line with the idea that 
R&D in the parent and target firm are complementary.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the dataset and presents some 
preliminary empirics on the link between foreign acquisition and R&D.  Section 3 describes the 
empirical methodology and Section 4 discusses the results.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Data and description 
 
The data are from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis, 
hereafter Growth Analysis (former Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies, ITPS). The dataset 
covers all manufacturing firms that operate in Sweden with at least 50 employees for the period 
1993-2002. The register information used in this analysis has been obtained from several sources 
and has been merged using unique identification numbers. The Structural Business Statistics (SBS) 
gives us information by firm on sales, investments, R&D,
2 various inputs, and whether it is foreign 
or domestic owned. Foreign owned firms (foreign MNEs) are firms where foreigners possess more 
than 50% of the voting rights. The Growth Analysis survey data provides information on all 
Swedish controlled enterprise groups with subsidiaries abroad. A Swedish MNE is then a 
                                                 
2 In the SBS database firms should specify their yearly R&D spending within specific intervals of SEK; 1-249 000, 
250 000-999 000, 1-4.9 million, 5-9.9 million and then 10 million or more. If the yearly R&D expenditures exceed 10 
million SEK, the firms should specify the exact amount. The R&D information covers firms that have a minimum of 
one employee who is active in any R&D activity at 50% of a full time employment. Moreover, the SBS R&D statistics 
are retrieved annually and it is compulsory for firms to reply. R&D is not evenly distributed across industries.   6
domestically owned firm that is part of an enterprise with affiliates abroad.
3 Non-MNE firms are 
firms that are neither Swedish MNEs nor foreign MNEs. By using the information on ownership 
status we can define foreign acquisition of a domestic MNE as a change in ownership indicator 
from a domestic MNE to foreign and foreign acquisition of a domestic non-MNE as a change in 
ownership indicator from a domestic non-MNE to foreign.
4  
 
Since R&D data are only available for firms with at least 50 employees we have to restrict the 
analysis to firms above this threshold. This should not prevent us from drawing general conclusions 
for the Swedish manufacturing sector since data cover more than three fourth of total value added in 
the manufacturing sector.
5 Moreover, two-thirds of all private R&D is concentrated to the large top 
ten R&D firms, see Karpaty and Tingvall (2009). This should motivate an analysis on larger firms 
only. 
 
From  Table 1 we see that the number of foreign MNEs and employment in these firms have 
increased during the whole period in manufacturing industries. The opposite pattern is observed for 
Swedish MNEs which may indicate that the main target for foreign acquisitions of Swedish firms 
during the 1990’s have been large Swedish MNEs, such as Astra, Pharmacia, Volvo Car, Saab 
Automobile.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
 
We find some support for this hypothesis in Table 2, by, e.g, taking a closer look at the noticeably 
large changes of foreign presence in the Chemical industry and Motor vehicles. Table 2 provides 
the distribution of the number of firms between 22 industries at the two digit level in 1993 and 
2002. The distribution of foreign and domestic MNEs is characterized by large heterogeneity 
between different industries and over time. Consistent with the rising presence of foreign firms in 
the Swedish economy over time, the observed trend is upwards sloping across these different 
measures. It appears that the presence of foreign firms decreased between 1993 and 2002 in only 
                                                 
3 The first year in which we can distinguish Swedish MNEs from non-MNEs is 1993 and explains why our analysis 
begins in 1993. 
4 Firms that switch between domestic and foreign ownership more than once over the period are not included in the 
sample. Also, firms that disappear from the sample one year and reappear in later years are excluded.  
5 Karpaty (2006) shows that in 1997, firms with at least 50 employees constituted about 77.5% of total employment and 
82% of total value added in the manufacturing sector.   7
five out of 22 industries (in two other industries there was no foreign presence at all). The opposite 
pattern is found for domestic MNEs whose share of all firms fell in eleven out of 22 industries 
during the same period. This again reflects the large extent of foreign acquisitions of domestic 
MNEs. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 shows differences in mean values of some firm characteristics between domestic and 
foreign–owned firms in 2002.  We compare unweighted averages and use t-statistics for any 
possible difference between foreign and domestic firms for each variable.  What seems to matter in 
general is not whether the firm is foreign or domestically owned but whether the firm is 
multinational or not (see also Criscuolo and Martin, 2010).  There is a statistically significant 
difference in all variables when we compare Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs. Hence, foreign and 
Swedish MNEs are more R&D intensive, larger, use more skilled labor, are more productive and 
pay higher wages than their non-multinational counterparts.  This is in line with the idea, pointed 
out in the introduction, that Swedish multinationals have more extensive HQ activities in Sweden 
than purely domestic firms.  Comparing Swedish and foreign MNEs we find that there is no 
statistically significant difference in terms of employment, sales, labor productivity, capital and skill 
intensity between the two firm types.  However, it seems clear that foreign owned firms invest more 
in R&D and pay higher wages than domestic multinationals.  
 
   Table 3 here 
 
We investigate in what follows whether this higher R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of 
expenditures by a firm on research and development to the firm's sales, in foreign MNEs is due to 
post-acquisition increases, or whether it may be explained by foreign firms targeting high R&D 
intensive domestic firms when choosing takeover targets.  To see how important foreign 
acquisitions were in the Swedish manufacturing sector, Table 4 reports the number of foreign 
acquisitions in the sample used in the analysis for the period 1993-2002.
6 
 
   Table 4 here 
 
                                                 
6 Note that these are acquisitions rather than mergers.  Our definition of an acquisition is that at least 50 percent of the 
voting rights are acquired by a foreign owner.     8
In  Table 5 we test the hypotheses that target and non-target Swedish firms have different 
characteristics before and after acquisitions using the sample of acquired and non acquired firms 
(i.e., disregarding firms that are always foreign-owned). It appears that acquired firms invest more 
in R&D one year prior to an acquisition. There are also other important differences pre- and post 
acquisitions. Target firms are in general larger in terms of employment and sales. They are also 
more productive than non-target firms. At the same time target firms have higher capital intensities 
– both in terms of physical capital and skill intensity (human capital intensity). According to Table 
6 most of these differences are maintained or even strengthened under the new ownership post 
acquisition. Human capital intensity and average wages do however decline in foreign owned firms 
post acquisitions. Overall this suggests that foreign ownership does matter. In the next section we 
will go beyond these mean values and analyze the effects of foreign acquisition on R&D intensity 
post acquisition more thoroughly. In order to control for initial differences we will also employ 
instrumental variables and propensity score matching techniques in order to identify an effect of 
foreign acquisition on R&D intensity. 
  





The aim of this paper is to evaluate the causal effect of foreign acquisition on R&D intensity in a 
targeted domestic firm.  We are also interested in whether this effect is different depending on 
whether the target is a domestic multinational or not.  In line with previous literature (e.g., Heckman 
et.al., 1997 and Deheija and Wahba, 2002), we define the average effect of acquisition of the 
acquired firms as: 
 
        1 1 1
0 1 0 1           it s t it s t it s t s t AF y E AF y E AF y y E  (1) 
 
where,    1 , 0  it AF  is an indicator of whether firm i is acquired by a foreign firm in time period t 
and 
1
s it y  and 
0
s it y   denote the outcome variable (in our case R&D intensity) following the 
acquisition year t for acquired and non-acquired firm, respectively. However, the problem is that 
0
s it y   is by definition unobservable. We have then to construct the counterfactual i.e. what would the   9
R&D intensity in acquired firms have been, on average, had they not been acquired. As a proxy we 
can use the average R&D intensity of firms that still are domestically owned,    0
0   it s it AF y E . 
However, differences in characteristics and performance between acquired and non-acquired firms 
in the years before acquisition could bias the estimates of the causal effect of foreign acquisition. 
Also, there are strong reasons to believe that the acquisition dummy, it AF , is endogenously 
determined. We use several methods to deal with these problems. 
 
The first strategy to estimate the impact of ownership change on the growth rate in R&D intensity 
in acquired firms, is to use difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation given by the following 
equation: 
 








s t s t y y y y 1 1               (2)   
 
The first part of the right-hand side of equation (2) determines the difference in our outcome 
variable between the pre and post acquisition period for the acquired firms A and the second part 
determines the difference for the same variable and time period for the non-acquired firms C. We 
obtain an estimate for  s t   by using the following regression: 
 
              i t it it s it it d AF y y y 1  (3) 
 
where  i y   is growth in R&D intensity between time period t-1 and t+s;    3 , 2 , 1  s .  it AF  is a 
dummy variable switching from acquired firms from 0 to 1 after the acquisition year t.  It is 0 for 
non-acquired firms C.  dt is a vector of time dummies, and μi is a firm specific time invariant effect.  
The estimate of β yields the average percentage point change in the growth rate in R&D intensity 
that can be attributed to foreign acquisition.  
 
However, the estimation of β in equation (3) rests on the assumption that domestic firms taken over 
by foreign MNEs are randomly acquired. This is, arguably, a strong assumption. In order to control 
for the possible endogeneity we utilize, as a second estimation strategy, an instrumental variable 
approach by using the predicted probability of being acquired as an instrument. This is shown to be 
a valid strategy by Vella and Verbeck (1999) and was implemented in the context of acquisitions by   10
McGukin and Nguyen (2001) and Bandick and Görg (2010).  This may be an appropriate 
instrument as it is likely to be highly correlated with the actual acquisition.  However, given that not 
all firms with a similar takeover probability are actually acquired, the predicted probability is less 
likely to be correlated with the error term in equation (5).  Of course, we test for validity and 
relevance of the instruments using standard tests.   
 
In line with this approach, we generate a firm’s predicted value of being acquired from the 
following probit model: 
  
  ) , , ( ) 1 ( 1 t j it it T I X F AF P     (4) 
 
where again  1  AF  if a domestically owned firms in year t-1 become foreign owned in year t. 
1  it X  is a vector of relevant firm specific characteristics in year t-1 which may affect the firms’ 
probability of being acquired in year t.  I and  T control for fixed industry and time effects. The 
generated value for the acquisition dummy is then used as an instrument in equation (3): 
 
              i t it
IV
it s it it d AF y y y 1     (5) 
 
The instrumental variables approach of course hinges on the validity and relevance of the excluded 
instruments in the first step.  We also employ additional strategies that do not rely on such 
exclusion restrictions being imposed, namely, combined differences-in-differences propensity score 
matching (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  The idea of the propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach is to find for every foreign acquired firm, a similar firm that has remained in domestic 
hands and from which we can approximate the non-observed counterfactual event. Thus, the 
matching technique enables us to construct a sample of acquired and non-acquired firms with 
similar pre-acquisition characteristics X, e.g. productivity, wages, size etc. Conditional on these 
characteristics we estimate the probability (or propensity score) of being acquired by a foreign firm 
using the same probit model as in equation (4). 
   11
Once the propensity scores are calculated, we can select the nearest control firms in which the 
propensity score falls within a pre-specified radius as a match for an acquired firm.
7 Moreover, we 
check whether the balancing condition is verified, that is each independent variable does not differ 
significantly between acquired and non-acquired firms.  Another condition that must be fulfilled in 
the matching procedure is the so-called common support condition.
8  
 
We use the propensity score matching for two different set ups.  The first is what may be called an 
“indirect” approach of PSM where we use the propensity score to select a matched sample of 
acquired and “nearest neighbour” non-acquired firms.  We then estimate equation (3) on this 
matched sample of firms.  This approach was recently applied in the international economics 
literature by Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Bandick and Görg (2010).   
 
The second approach is the “direct” matching estimator as described by Blundell and Costa Dias 
(2000) and recently employed by, for example, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Girma and Görg 
(2007).  Let  i p  denote the predicted probability of being acquired (generated using equation (4)) for 
firm i in the group of acquired firms (A) and  j p  is the predicted probability of being acquired for 
plant j in the control group (C).   y   is the difference between the average R&D intensity before and 
after the change of ownership.  Then the difference-in-differences matching estimator can be 
expressed as:  
 







   
A iC j
i j i i y ) p , p ( g y  .                                                      (6)  
 
where g(.) is a function assigning the weights to be placed on the comparison firm j while 
constructing the counterfactual for acquired firm i.  In the case of nearest neighbor matching as 
employed in this paper, this function selects a pj as close to pi as possible.   
                                                 
7 This is done using the “caliper” matching method. The procedure we utilize to match acquired and non-acquired firms 
is the PSMATCH2 routine in Stata version 10 described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In our analysis, the pre-specified 
radius is set to 0.001. In the appendix, Table A1 presents the results of estimating two alternatives of equation (4).  
Column (i) is the model used for the estimations reported in the main part of the paper, column (ii) presents a robustness 
check.  Tables A2 and A3 report the resulting propensity scores and tests of the balancing conditions.   
8 Note that some acquired firms may be matched with more than one non-acquired firm, while acquired firms not 
matched with a non-acquired firm are excluded.  Eventually, we end up with a sample, henceforth denoted the matched 
sample which consists of 227 acquired firms and 2,842 non-acquired firms.     12
 
Before turning to estimating the effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D, we look at the 
characteristics of the target firm that are correlated with foreign acquisition.  To do so, Table A1 in 
the appendix presents the results of estimating the probit for equation (4).  The estimates indicate 
that the more productive, skill- and capital intensive the domestic firms are, the more likely they are 
to be acquired by foreign MNEs. Moreover, firms in industries with a large foreign presence are 




4. Empirical  results 
 
We now turn to identifying the effect of foreign acquisition on domestic R&D activity.  As 
discussed in the previous section, we use alternative estimation strategies in order to evaluate the 
relationship between the foreign acquisition of domestic firms and R&D activity. First, we present 
the results from estimating equation (3) with OLS in order to establish a benchmark.  This estimator 
of course disregards the firm specific effect μi.  Hence, we then estimate the equation using a fixed 
effects (FE) technique.  In this set up, β1 can be interpreted as the difference-in-differences estimate 
of the effect of foreign acquisition on R&D in the target firm.  Results are shown in Table 6.  
 
In the first two columns we report the results of estimating equation (3) for the growth rate of R&D 
intensity for the period one year before and one year after foreign acquisition. In column (iii) to (iv) 
and (v) to (vi) we expand our analysis of the growth rate of R&D intensity to also include the 
difference between  1  t and  2 t   and  1  t  and  3 t  , respectively.  These baseline results indicate 
that foreign acquired firms have had larger growth in R&D intensity in the years following takeover 
as compared to non-acquired firms. The difference in the growth rate of R&D intensity between 
acquired and non-acquired firms one year after the takeover is around 5 percent. This increases to 8 
percent two years after the foreign takeover while it returns to around 5 percent in the third post-
acquisition year. 
       Table 6 here 
These results provide initial evidence that fears about foreign acquisitions leading to less R&D 
activity in the target firms appear to be misplaced.  A possible explanation for these positive effects 
is that, as highlighted by Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Bertrand et al. (2008), R&D in the home   13
and target country are complements and, hence, an acquirer will find it beneficial to expand R&D in 
the target country.  An alternative, not mutually exclusive explanation is that the foreign acquisition 
leads to an inflow of new technology, which boosts R&D activity.  Unfortunately, with the data at 
hand we are not able to discriminate between such alternative explanations.  The focus of the 
further analysis is, rather, to establish the robustness of a causal relationship between foreign 
acquisitions and R&D, and to investigate whether there are differences in effects depending on 
whether the target firm is itself a multinational or not.   
 
Of course, unobserved differences in firm characteristics and performance between acquired and 
non-acquired firms in the years before acquisition could bias the estimates of the causal effect of 
foreign acquisition on R&D in the target. The information in Table 5 and the result from the probit 
model in Table A1 provide us with some evidence that this may indeed be a problem in our case, as 
firms with “good” characteristics and performance are more likely to be targeted for acquisitions by 
foreigners.  These characteristics are likely to be correlated with R&D activity, hence, not 
considering this endogeneity problem implies that we may falsely attribute the post-acquisition firm 
performance to the foreign takeover.  
 
To overcome this problem, we employ a number of alternative estimation strategies as outlined in 
Section 3.  We first estimate the DiD model in equation (5) which instruments for the acquisition 
dummy in order to allow for endogeneity of this variable.  We use the predicted probability of 
foreign acquisition (as in Table A1) as an instrument.  In order to allow us to test for instrument 
validity based on overidentification restrictions, we include the share of acquisitions in an industry 
as additional instrument.  The rationale is that firms are more likely to be targeted for acquisitions in 
sectors with high acquisition activity.  However, given the dispersion of R&D activity within a 
sector, this variable is unlikely to be correlated with the error term in equation (5), conditional on 
the other control variables included in the instrumental variables regression.   
 
Table 7 presents the results. The Sargan test reported in the table suggests that we have a valid 
instrument in column (i), but that the instrument is more problematic in columns (ii) and (iii).  The 
F-test from the first stage regression shows in all cases that the instrumental variables candidates are 
relevant instruments, in the sense of being strongly correlated with the acquisition dummy.   
Furthermore, in this linear regression framework we can test for possible endogeneity using a   14
Hausman test; the test statistics support the notion that foreign acquisitions might be endogenous to 
the process of R&D growth.   
 
The results in column (i) show that one year after the acquisition, acquired firms have had 
significantly higher growth in R&D intensity as compared to non-acquired firms. Column (ii), 
shows the growth rate in R&D intensity between the period one year before and two years after the 
acquisition.  We still find a positive effect, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  Column (iii) also shows a positive acquisition effect on R&D intensity.  The 
instrumental variables estimation, hence, underline our earlier results in Table 6, namely, the 
foreign acquisitions generally tend to have positive effects on R&D activity of the takeover targets.
9     
        
       Table 7 here 
 
This approach, of course, hinges on the validity and relevance of the excluded instruments in the 
first step.  In what follows, we use two alternative strategies based on propensity score matching, 
which do not rely on such exclusion restrictions being imposed.  Table 8 reports the results of 
estimating the difference-in-differences model in equation (3), on a matched sample of acquired and 
non-acquired firms obtained by implementing the propensity score matching approach.
10 The 
estimates show once again that the growth in R&D intensity is much higher in foreign acquired 
firms than in non-acquired firms. From column (i)-(ii) we can observe that one year after the 
takeover the R&D intensity grow around 5 percent more in acquired firm as relative to non-
acquired firms and as shown in column (iii)-(iv) and (v)-(vi) around 8 and 6 percent two and three 
years after the takeover, respectively.
11  
                                                 
9 We also estimated alternative specifications of the acquisition probit equation (4) to check whether the results reported 
here depend on the process by which the instrument was generated.  Specifically, we use an alternative instrument for 
the acquisition dummy generated from the second column in the probit regression in Table A1.  The results of this are 
reported in Table A4 in the appendix.  They underline that the results are robust to alternative definitions of the 
instruments.  Note that this alternative instrument also passes the Sargan test of overidentification restrictions 
specifically in column (ii).   
10 The matched sample is obtained using the same variables as in column (i) in Table A1. Following the suggestion of 
Dehejia (2005), a further robustness check is to investigate the sensitivity of the matching estimates to minor changes in 
the propensity score model.  If the results are not sensitive to such minor changes, the propensity score specification can 
be deemed robust and reliable.  To do so, we have also used the probit in column (ii) to generate the propensity score.  
The results, not reported here but available upon request, are similar to those in Table 8.   
11 Before matching firms together the sample consist of two subgroups: domestic firms acquired by foreign firms and a 
group of similar domestic firms that remained domestic during the period 1993-2002. We define the treatment group to 
be firms that sometime during the period become foreign owned. We exclude Greenfield operations and firms that   15
        Table 8 here 
 
Finally, Table 9 shows the results of the “direct” difference-in-differences propensity score 
estimator as described in equation (6).  Again, we find positive acquisition effects, although the 
estimate is not statistically significant for the three year difference.  The point estimates are 
somewhat lower than in the previous estimations, suggesting that foreign acquisition implies a 
roughly 2.2 to 3.6 percent increase in the growth of R&D intensity in the target firm.   
 
        Table 9 here 
 
Overall, these results suggest that foreign acquisitions in general have positive effects on R&D 
activity in the target firm.  This may be due to additional technology transfer after acquisition, or to 
complementarity of R&D undertaken in the home country of the foreign acquirer and the target 
firm.  In the policy debate, particular attention is paid to what happens to headquarters, and in 
particular R&D activity of domestic multinationals if they are taken over by a foreign firm.  As 
pointed out in the introduction, this may be an important issue given that MNEs may be expected to 
have more extensive headquarter activities in Sweden.
12  We now dig deeper into our data to 
investigate this.  Specifically, to allow for different impacts of foreign acquisitions on R&D 
intensity depending on whether a Swedish MNE or Swedish non-MNE is acquired, we add in 
equation (5) interaction variables, of the two firm type dummies multiplied with the instrumented 
acquisition dummy.  The first interaction variable then captures the DiD between acquired Swedish 
MNEs and non-acquired firms while the second interaction variable captures the DiD between 
acquired non-MNEs and non-acquired firms.  
 
Table 10 shows the results. We use similar probit models as in Table A1 to generate the IV for the 
dummies acquired Swedish MNEs and acquired Swedish non-MNEs. The results indicate that as 
compared to non-acquired firms, both targeted Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs have higher growth 
in R&D intensity one year after the takeover. It seems also that targeted Swedish non-MNEs have 
higher growth in R&D intensity two and three year after the acquisition as compared to non-
acquired firms in the same period. However, there is no significant difference in R&D intensity 
                                                                                                                                                                  
became foreign owned before 1994 and firms that switch between domestic and foreign owned more than once. 
Moreover, only firms that survive at least four years in the panel are included in the analysis. 
12 This is also reflected in the summary statistics in Table 3.     16
growth between targeted Swedish MNEs and non-acquired firms two years after acquisition but in 
the third year after the takeover it seems that this difference is again positive and significant.  
 
        Table 10 here 
 
To check whether the results in Table 10 are robust we first report in Table 11 estimations of the 
difference-in-differences model using the matched sample. The results for targeted Swedish non-
MNEs are similar to these in Table 10. However, the difference in the growth in R&D intensity 
between targeted Swedish MNEs and non-acquired firms seems in Table 11 is positive and 
significant both in the second and in the third post-acquisition year.  Table 12, finally, reports the 
results of the “direct” DiD propensity score matching approach.  This also shows that foreign 
acquisition has positive and statistically significant effects on R&D activity in the target firm, 
irrespective of whether the target is a domestic multinational or not.
13 
    
Table 11 and Table 12 here 
 
These results can be interpreted in the light of the theoretical ideas by Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and 
Bertrand et al. (2008).  While we cannot test explicitly whether or not R&D in the parent and target 
firm are complements or substitutes, our results are in line with the idea that they are complements.  
Hence, the foreign acquirer has an incentive to increase R&D activity in the target firm post 
acquisition, as predicted by the models.  We find robust evidence in the data that there is indeed 
such a positive effect on R&D after the foreign acquisition has taken place.   
 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Overall it would appear that the increased foreign presence in terms of foreign acquisitions of 
Swedish firms has had small and positive effects on the R&D activity in these firms.  The point 
estimates from our preferred difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimator suggest 
increases in R&D intensity by between 3 to 10 percent after foreign acquisition.  These effects are 
                                                 
13 As a final robustness check we estimated the DiD on the matched sample, and the difference-in-differences 
propensity score matching estimator on a balanced sample, i.e., only using firms that survived from t-1 through to t+3.  
The results, which are provided in the appendix, are very similar to what is reported in Tables 11 and 12.     17
stronger for the acquisition of domestic non-multinationals than for Swedish multinationals.   
However, it is important to stress that even for the acquisition of Swedish multinationals, the effect 
on R&D is generally positive, never negative.  Hence, our results suggest that fears that the 
acquisition of large Swedish multinationals by foreign owners may lead to a relocation of 
headquarter and in particular R&D activities abroad appear unfounded.   
 
These results are obtained from an econometric analysis of detailed firm level data for Sweden.  
The question we ask in this paper is whether or not there is a causal relationship between foreign 
acquisitions and R&D intensity. We use different estimation strategies to control for selection bias 
in the evaluation of causal effects. First we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach treating the 
acquisition dummy as potentially endogenous and hence using a vector of instruments for this 
variable. In order to control the robustness of these results we proceed by using combinations of 
propensity score matching and DiD estimations.   
 
Even though our empirical design is not aimed at testing directly a theoretical model, our results are 
broadly in line with theoretical ideas by Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Bertrand et al. (2008).  These 
models suggest that acquisition occurs if there is complementarity between the assets of acquirer 
and target.  In our case it suggests complementarity between R&D at home and in Sweden.  As 
predicted by the theoretical models, if there is complementarity then foreign acquirers are likely to 
invest further in R&D in the acquisition target.   
 
Our findings are highly policy relevant.  The implication of our analysis is that foreign acquisitions 
can have beneficial effects for domestic R&D activity.  Hence, there is no need for fears and 
therefore no need for policy makers to start thinking about limiting international merger and 
acquisition activity.  Quite the contrary: foreign acquisitions may be an important way to generate 
new knowledge and contribute to boosting the level of technology in the domestic economy.   
   18
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Table 2  Development of MNEs and non-MNEs in Sweden by industry in percent. 
  1993, 2002 















Food & beverages  15  26,79  13,39  59,82  28,87  9,28  61,86 
Tobacco products  16  0,00  100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00  0,00 
Textiles 17  25,00  21,43  53,57 28,57  25,00  46,43 
Apparel  18  11,11  44,44 44,44 0,00  100,00 0,00 
Leather,  footwear  19  0,00  100,00 0,00 0,00  0,00 100,00 
Wood  20  3,64 27,27 69,09  17,50  13,33 69,17 
Paper & pulp  21  18,75  47,92 33,33  42,86  34,92 22,22 
Publishing, printing  22  9,62  17,31 73,08  13,19  21,53 65,28 
Coke  & petroleum  23  0,00  100,00  0,00  100,00  0,00  0,00 
Chemicals 24  44,78  35,82  19,40 66,67  17,33  16,00 
Rubber & plastic  25  25,93  46,30 27,78  34,21  46,05 19,74 
Non-metallic mineral  26  19,30  52,63 28,07  55,81  13,95 30,23 
Basic metals  27  24,44  46,67 28,89  53,06  22,45 24,49 
Fabricated metal  28  11,67  34,17 54,17  17,87  29,47 52,66 
Machinery,  equipm.  29  23,12  46,24 30,64  32,38  36,67 30,95 
Electrical & optical  30  62,50  12,50  25,00  9,09  27,27  63,64 
Electrical machinery  31  45,10  15,69 39,22  42,86  28,57 28,57 
Radio  TV  32  29,17  37,50 33,33  27,59  41,38 31,03 
Medical  instruments  33  25,71  57,14 17,14  53,33  31,11 15,56 
Motor  vehicles  34  18,00  40,00 42,00  32,94  40,00 27,06 
Other transport eq.  35  34,62  34,62 30,77  29,03  25,81 45,16 
Other manufacturing  36  10,77  33,85 55,38  21,79  34,62 43,59 
Notes: The sample is truncated at 50 employees. Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
    Foreign MNEs  Swedish MNEs    Swedish non-MNEs 
Year   Firms  Employment   Firms  Employment  Firms  Employment 
   (Percent)   Percent   (Percent)   Percent   (Percent)   Percent 
1993 255  (20.5)  21.0  421 (33.8)  54.0  568  (45.7)  25.0 
1994 274  (21.5)  22.0  434 (34.1)  56.7  565  (44.4)  21.3 
1995 297  (22.2)  22.9  427 (31.9)  54.9  616  (46.0)  22.2 
1996 336  (24.6)  26.6  400 (29.3)  51.1  631  (46.2)  22.2 
1997 353  (25.6)  26.3  400 (29.0)  54.3  628  (45.5)  19.4 
1998 392  (26.5)  28.5  403 (27.3)  51.5  683  (46.2)  20.0 
1999 399  (27.6)  34.7  410 (28.3)  43.0  639  (44.1)  22.3 
2000 422  (28.3)  39.2  422 (28.3)  39.5  649  (43.5)  21.3 
2001 444  (29.8)  45.0  408 (27.3)  33.8  640  (42.9)  21.2 
2002 447  (30.7)  46.4  406 (27.9)  34.5  601  (41.3)  19.1   22
Table 3  Characteristics of MNEs (foreign and Swedish) and non-MNEs in Swedish 
 manufacturing  2002. 
   2002 










MNEs and non-MNEs 
(t-ratio) 
R&D intensity  28.5  23.4  5.1 (2.19)  8.8  14.6 (8.41) 
Employment 408  334  74  (1.05)  125 209  (6.31) 
Sales  711  536  175 (1.12)  151  385 (5.23) 
Labor productivity  452  438  14 (0.68)  364  74 (5.45) 
Capital-labor ratio  220  143  77 (1.43)  51  92 (3.51) 
Skill intensity  20.1  18.7  1.4 (1.44)  14.2  4.5 (5.29) 
Average wage  204 197  7  (2.73)  179  18  (7.33) 
Notes: Labor productivity is measured as value added, deflated by the industry producer price index, per employee. 
Physical capital is here measured by the book value of machinery and buildings, per employee and human capital 





Table 4  Frequency of foreign acquisitions by year 1993-2002 
   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002  94-02 
Acquired  Swedish  MNE 1 5  26  3 5  10  6 3 9  68 
            
Acquired  Swedish  Non-MNE  18 16 20 11 11 14 14 39 16  159 
            
Total  19 21 46 14 16 24 20 42 25  227 
   23
 
Table 5  Pre- and post acquisition differences in means between acquired and non-acquired firms. 
  Variable  T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 
 Difference  Difference  Difference Difference 
  (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) 
      






      






      





      






      






      






      






      
  Observations      
  Acquired  firms  89 89 89 89 
  Non- Acquired firms   4,095  4,095  4,095  4,095 
Notes: Shipment is in million SEK. Wages, capital-labor ratios and labor productivity, value added per employee, are in 
thousand SEK. R&D intensity and Skill intensity, share of employees with a post-secondary education, are in 
percentages.   24
Table 6   Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity unmatched sample, OLS and Fixed effect 
model.  
  ΔR&D intensityt+1 ΔR&D intensityt+2 ΔR&D intensityt+3 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
(i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi) 








        
Observation 9,612  9,612  8,266  8,266  6,940  6,940 
R
2  0.024    0.034    0.043   
R
2 Within   0.016    0.017    0.017 
R
2 Between   0.009    0.001    0.001 
R
2 Overall   0.016    0.014    0.013 
          
Notes: In estimations where OLS is used year and industry dummies are controlled for. Industries are defined at the 
SNI92 3-digit level (99 industries). Standard errors within the parenthesis. a, b and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7   Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity, instrumental variable approach.  






  (i) (ii) (iii) 




     
Observation 9,612  8,266  6,940 
F-test (first-stage reg.)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.132  0.020  0.002 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.000  0.001  0.000 
Notes: In all columns year and industry dummies are controlled for. Industries are defined at the SNI92 3-digit level (99 
industries). Standard errors within the parenthesis are bootstrapped. a, b and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Estimations in Model (1) use an instrument generated from the probit regression reported in 
Table A1, column (i).   
 
 
Table 8 Post-acquisition  effect  on  R&D intensity, matched sample, OLS and Fixed effect 
model.  
 
Notes: See Table 6.   
 
  ΔR&D intensityt+1 ΔR&D intensityt+2 ΔR&D intensityt+3 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
(i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi) 


















        
Observation 3,069  3,069  2,644  2,644  2,215  2,215 
R
2  0.040    0.048    0.065   
R
2 Within   0.015    0.017    0.012 
R
2 Between   0.064    0.016    0.010 
R
2 Overall   0.018    0.018    0.013   25
 
Table 9  Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity, DiD Matching estimator 
 
   Foreign  acquired   
   DiD  T-stat  
ΔR&D intensity     0.036  (5.51)
***  
     0.022  (2.61)
***  
     0.016  (1.60)  
              
 
 
Table 10  Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity in different targets, instrumental variable 
approach.  






  (i) (ii) (iii) 
Acquired 0.339  0.188  0.444 
Swedish MNE  (2.42)
b (1.12) (2.25)
b 
      
Acquired  0.372 1.067 1.531 




      
Observation 9,612  8,266  6,940 
F-test (first-stage reg.)       
Sargan test (p-value)       
Hausman test (p-value)       
Notes: See Table 7.   
 
Table 11   Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity in different targets, matched sample, OLS 
  and Fixed effect model. 
 
 
Notes: See Table 8. 
 
  ΔR&D intensityt+1 ΔR&D intensityt+2 ΔR&D intensityt+3 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
(i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi) 
Acquired 0.013  0.025  0.093  0.089  0.068  0.079 





        
Acquired  0.062 0.063 0.074 0.071 0.061 0.061 







        
Observation 3,069  3,069  2,644  2,644  2,215  2,215 
R
2  0.041    0.048    0.065   
R
2 Within   0.016    0.017    0.012 
R
2 Between    0.060    0.017    0.012 
R
2 Overall    0.018    0.018    0.014   26
Table 12  Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity in different targets, DiD Matching estimator 
 
    Acquired Swedish  
MNE 
   Acquired  Swedish 
non-MNE 
 
   DiD  T-stat     DiD T-stat   
ΔR&D intensity   0.023  (2.45)
**     0.064 (2.98)
***  
   0.046  (3.44)
***     0.095 (3.37)
***  
   0.052  (3.18)
***     0.094 (2.82)
***  
              
   27
Appendix 
 
Details on the probit estimation 
 
The predicted value of the acquisition dummy is generated using the probit model described in 
equation (4). To check the robustness of our result we estimate two alternative specification to 
generate the predicted probability.  The results in Table A1 indicate that the more productive, skill- 
and capital intensive the domestic firms are, the more likely they are being acquired by foreign 
MNEs. Moreover, firms in industries with a large foreign presence are more likely to be taken over. 
 
Table A1  The Probit model. Probability of foreign acquisition  
Variables  Model (1)  Model (2) 
    




    
Relative employment  -0.002  -0.001 
 (0.54)  (0.04) 
    




    




    
(Age)




    




    
Capital intensity  0.054   
 (2.47)
a  
    
Sales   0.015 
   (1.58) 
    
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
    
Pseudo R
2 0.058  0.056 
LR chi2  108.61  104.19 
Observations 9,612  9,612 
Notes: The dependent variable  1  it AF  if a domestically owned firm in year  1  t  becomes foreign owned in year t. z-
statistics is within parentheses. The explanatory variables are, apart from age age
2, firm specific characteristics in year 
1  t . Relative employment is firm employment relative to mean firm employment at the industry level. Labor 
productivity is value added per employee and skill intensity is the share of employees with post-secondary education at 
the firm level. The share of foreign employment at industry the level (SNI92 2-digit level) is used as a proxy for foreign 
presence. a, b and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   28
 
Table A2  Description of the estimated propensity score 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest 
1%  0.00608 0.00184 0.00555 0.00207 
5%  0.00834 0.00214 0.00861 0.00220 
10%  0.00986 0.00223 0.01018 0.00235 
25%  0.01335 0.00235 0.01348 0.00242 
      
50%  0.01915  0.01922  
   Largest  Largest 
75%  0.02851 0.14298 0.02850 0.14217 
90%  0.04348 0.14678 0.04289 0.14663 
95%  0.05456 0.15474 0.05385 0.15500 
99%  0.08399 0.17731 0.08247 0.17733 
      
Observation 9,612  9,612 
Sum of Wgt.  9,612  9,612 
Mean 0.02360  0.02360 
Std. Dev.  0.01582  0.01549 
Variance 0.00025  0.00024 
Skewness 2.29449  2.27748 
Kurtosis  11.1911 11.3516 
Note: The common support option has been selected. 
 
 
Table A3  Test of balancing property of the propensity score 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Acquisition   Acquisition  
Inferior of 
block of pscore 
0 1  0 1 
0 6,476  101  6,403  101 
0.025  2,324 71 2,422 72 
0.05 552  48  530  50 
0.1  33 7 30 4 
      
Total 9,385  227  9,385  227 
     
Note: The balancing property is satisfied. 
   29
 
Table A4  Robustness check: Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity, alternative instrument. 






  (i) (ii) (iii) 




     
Observation 9,612  8,266  6,940 
F-test (first-stage reg.)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.051  0.297  0.002 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Notes: See Table 7. Estimations in Model (2) use an instrument generated from the probit regression reported in Table 
A1, column (ii).   
 
 
Table A5  Post-acquisition effect on R&D intensity in different targets, matched sample, OLS 
  and Fixed effect model. Balanced sample. 
 
 
Notes: See Table 6. 
 
Table A6  Average effect of foreign acquisition on growth rate of R&D intensity in acquired 
Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs. Balanced sample. 
 
    Acquired Swedish  
MNE 
   Acquired  Swedish 
non-MNE 
 
   DiD  T-stat     DiD T-stat   
ΔR&D intensity   0.046  (4.22)
**    0.046 (153)  
   0.053  (3.55)
***    0.086 (2.66)
***   
   0.052  (3.18)
***    0.094 (2.82)
*** 





  ΔR&D intensityt+1 ΔR&D intensityt+2 ΔR&D intensityt+3 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
(i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi) 
Acquired 0.012  0.023  0.069  0.067  0.068  0.079 





        
Acquired  0.052 0.052 0.079 0.077 0.061 0.061 







        
Observation 2,215  2,215  2,215  2,215  2,215  2,215 
R
2  0.040    0.051    0.065   
R
2 Within   0.013    0.016    0.012 
R
2 Between   0.037    0.012    0.012 
R
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